The Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as several other ministers and senior officials, have recently been replaced. The presidential administration emerges from this process strengthened. It is now possible to foresee three scenarios for the continuation of the war, each corresponding equally to key sequences in the history of France in the 20th century.to during the First World War and the wars in Indochina and Algeria in the 19th century.
While international attention is often focused on military developments on the front lines (for example, the Kursk offensive this summer or the situation in Donbas), it is important not to ignore the political dynamics in the rear. Indeed, the stability of the Ukrainian regime during the war has a major impact on the conduct of military operations and the morale of the population. In this respect, the major political reshuffle in September, which involved about ten ministers and many senior officials, raises fundamental questions.
What implications will this change have for Kiev’s strategy at a time when the “victory narrative” is essential to maintaining public and international support?
To answer this, three possible scenarios can be examined, each offering a different perspective on the possible evolution of the Ukrainian regime in the face of a lull in the war. These trajectories should enable reflection on possible dynamics based on current political preferences and existing constraints.
Political regime under tension due to war
First of all, it is important to correctly contextualize the biggest change since the beginning of the war at the political and institutional level. In political terms, the war inevitably contributed to the strengthening of executive power, especially since martial law has been imposed since February 24, 2022. President Zelensky remains the head of the war around whom the main decisions are made, even though his term ended last May.
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Prime Minister Denys Chmyhal, who has been in office since March 2020, remains in office but has seen many ministers who focus on external partners lose their portfolios, including Deputy Prime Minister Olga Stefanishyna, who is responsible for the temporarily occupied Iryna regions, Vereshchouk, and especially Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. He has also lost many people responsible for economic and energy matters, as well as strategic issues that would support the war of attrition. While such a change in peacetime would be subject to much comment, the announcement did not spark much debate in Kiev.
It should also be noted that, at the institutional level, the Parliament (where the President is dominated by the Servant of the People party) and the government today find themselves relatively marginal to the presidency (and its administration) in terms of strategic decision-making.
Indeed, the head of the presidential administration, Andriy Yermak, has significant influence, having informal control over the activities of various institutions, the organization of meetings and access to the president. He also benefited from the perhaps temporary weakening of big business and the media due to the war, economic crisis and nationalizations. From this point of view, the resignation of the deputy head of the presidential administration, Rostyslav Shurma, is perhaps more significant than the resignation of some ministers, including many technical figures.
Understanding this political and institutional context is essential to envision the continuation of the conflict according to the three research scenarios.
“Pierre Mendès France’s negotiation” from strategic retreat to secession
This first scenario is based on the example of Pierre Mendès France, who ended the Indochina War in 1954 after years of costly conflict for France. Like the arrival of the PMF, Ukraine could be given new political momentum by a mission to negotiate an end to the conflict. But while an October 2022 decree prohibits any negotiations with Vladimir Putin, the ripple effect of the reshuffle appears to be too modest to trigger a move in that direction. This would require bringing in a strong figure who has the legitimacy that comes from the popular desire to end a long and exhausting war.
With that in mind, the executive branch’s goal would be to focus the country’s efforts on domestic reconstruction and post-war public confidence, while trying to protect national interests through diplomacy. The withdrawal strategy could include direct or internationally mediated negotiations with Russia to achieve a ceasefire, but at this stage public opinion is not in favor of concessions on political and territorial issues.
Such a scenario could temporarily strengthen the polarization between those who want to end the conflict in the country and those who want to continue it; however, the long-term consequences, especially in terms of the country’s reconstruction and geopolitical orientation, are difficult to manage. As in the case of the “PMF” in 1954, the key lies in the ability to negotiate a permanent settlement, but this risks being perceived by some as a kind of surrender. This is why this scenario is only likely in the medium or long term.
“Clemenceau’s call” between militarization and national unity
This second scenario is based on the example of Georges Clemenceau, who was appointed President of the Council in 1917, when France was exhausted from World War I. Clemenceau took drastic measures to increase the war effort and revive national unity, allowing France to hold out until victory.
In the Ukrainian context, such a change would ensure the strengthening of executive power around President Zelensky through the integration of “loyal” ministers (technical profiles subordinate to the president) and, possibly, profiles from military ranks.
In this sense, we can interpret the president’s desire to give the country “new energy”, while he was supposed to present his “victory plan” to Joe Biden at the end of September. Then the main goal will be to further centralize power, strengthen the state’s control over civil society and maximize the war effort, even if this means temporarily sacrificing certain civil liberties or making surprise attempts on the battlefield “to maintain the victory narrative.” A June 2024 study on this topic showed that 43% of Ukrainians believe that the quality of democracy has deteriorated during the Zelensky presidency, 28% attribute this to the actions of those in power, 11% to the war, and 3% to both.
This scenario could be effective in maintaining morale in the short term, especially if a few symbolic military victories are won. However, if the war continues without Kiev succeeding in retaking the occupied territories, the regime’s popularity could grow and Ukrainian society could split between those who support the war effort and those who oppose its expansion. The Clemenceau scenario is more likely in the medium term, given the progress of Ukrainian weapons and the pro-Ukrainian bias on the front lines.
“Guy Mollet syndrome” or inertia in the conduct of war
Finally, the third scenario describes the situation of French Prime Minister Guy Mollet during the Algerian War in the 1950s. Coming to power with the promise of resolving the conflict, Mollet intensified repression without offering any hope of peace in reality, and became mired in a protracted war. This strategy led to the gradual depletion of the population and the loss of political legitimacy.
In this scenario, political change in Ukraine will not bring any significant change in the course of the war. On the contrary, President Zelensky will prefer to maintain the status quo, prolonging the war while trying to mask the real costs of the conflict through increased censorship and propaganda policies. The aim will be to credibly maintain the “victory narrative,” but in reality the country will risk continuing to exhaust itself both economically and morally.
This inertia may make it possible to consolidate power in the short term by eliminating dissenting voices within the government and tightly controlling information. But in the long term, Ukrainian society may crumble under the weight of the sacrifices required and the new waves of recruitment to maintain the front, and the regime may lose popular support, plunging the country into a deep political crisis similar to that experienced by France at the end of the fourth century.to Republic. In the short term and if no progress is made, this last scenario seems to be the most likely one.
