It’s strange, because in the UK and the US we are obsessed with the Second World War. Books about it are constantly on the bestseller lists, writing them has almost become an industry. You can choose from monographs about the Normandy landings, the fall of Berlin, the Battle of Stalingrad or the Ardennes campaign. And the September campaign was almost a blank spot. In popular single-volume monographs on the Second World War, the invasion of Poland is usually described in a few short paragraphs. Sometimes it’s comical – everything comes down to games in the English Parliament, and the real battles are completely omitted.
What do German sources say about the September Campaign?
– Heinz Guderian’s memoirs are quite useful. But the rest is just propaganda. In 1939 and 1940, many books were published praising the German victory and emphasizing the inferiority of the Poles. Goebbels’ people spread the myth of Polish stupidity, the permanent element of which was the “cavalry attack on tanks”. And these fabricated stories were picked up by Western historiography. The British and French liked this image of the Second Polish Republic as a completely incompetent ally, because it avoided questions about its own responsibility.
After the war, the September Campaign became a marginal topic in German historiography. It was treated as a curiosity, irrelevant in the context of later events. Although great books like those by Jochen Boehler were rare.
It is difficult to understand today, but in Poland in September 1939 there was optimism among civilians and military personnel. Why?
– That’s a very good question. The fact that Poles were optimistic in September is incomprehensible from our point of view. But the job of a historian is to bring to light those voices that do not fit into our ideas.
This optimism was only partly due to the fact that the Polish media promised that the Germans would receive a booty. There were other reasons: Poland regained its independence thanks to the efforts of its soldiers. Then, with its own efforts, it defended the borders in 1920. It was extremely proud of its army.
An even greater paradox was that ordinary Germans did not want this war at all.
– Hitler was so popular because he managed to restore Germany’s position in the world and take control of the territories he wanted without starting a war. This was the case with the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia and Austria. The Germans were happy that he had done it this way and were convinced that the same would happen with Poland – he would threaten the Poles, there might be some military action, but it would not be a war. In the previous one they had lost two million people and did not want to go to another one. The guidelines sent immediately after Hitler’s speech announcing the conflict with Poland clearly emphasized that it should not be called a “war”, but rather “skirmishes caused by Polish attacks”.
Hitler was very keen for the Germans to buy into this version, which is why the Gliwice provocation was so important. It was supposed to be a way of portraying the Poles as scoundrels who had broken the peace and attacked Germany. Gliwice was a key element of Hitler’s plan also because he believed that thanks to this provocation he would be able to separate Poland from the Western Allies. He was extremely surprised when the British and French declared war on him.
How do you assess their attitude towards Poland?
– It was a betrayal, but I do not agree with those who see cynical Machiavellianism in the actions of the British and French – who pushed the Poles into the war to save their own skins for a while. Driven by their own arrogance, the British and French believed that it was enough for Hitler to say: if he tries again what he did in Czechoslovakia (with the consent of London and Paris, by the way), there will be consequences. However, apart from the ultimatum, there was no real plan of action.
They thought that the “paper tiger” would be enough to bring Hitler to his senses. But Hitler was not a reasonable man. Besides, a large part of the French believed that one should not “die for Gdańsk”. As a result, the French did nothing serious. True, they entered the Saarland on September 7…
But they did it without conviction.
– General Gamelin acted as if his only goal was not to lose any soldiers. And they could have achieved quite a lot. The German army in the West was very weak, the French outnumbered them 3 to 1, but they did not know that. If they had attacked more zealously, they would have quickly realized their strength. All the actions of the French were inflated to the limit by the Polish media. It was announced that they would arrive soon, that they had already captured Stuttgart and bombed Frankfurt. Pure fantasy.
The Poles’ strategic plan was based on the assumption that they would receive help from the Western powers. When they did not receive this help, this plan lost all meaning. The Germans were much stronger, but the lack of help from the West increased their advantage even further. This is a key element in all these events.
Did the Poles have a chance? One million soldiers made us the fifth largest in the world. At the same time, in the last five years before the war, the Polish armament budget amounted to 3%. German.
– The Poles had no chance. In artillery the Germans had a 3:1 advantage, in tanks the same, and in aviation 5:1. In addition, Polish equipment was much older, slower and less effective. One of the scoffers described the situation in the Polish army as the implementation of the “doctrine of poverty”. This had obvious consequences – when we compare the losses in the September Campaign, the number of casualties among Polish soldiers is four times higher.
It is, of course, regrettable that Poland did not invest in modernizing the army and that the command did not understand the essence of modern conflict. However, this required very, very large expenditures, and the Polish economy had no possibility of bearing these costs. The amount that Germany spent on one armored division was greater than the entire Polish military budget.
Above all, Poland was a loser because of its location. Both Hitler and Stalin did not agree with its continued existence. This was the essence of the problem: as long as Germany and the Soviet Union were hostile to each other, as they were for most of the 1930s, Poland could function in relative stability. But once both countries found a common goal, it became clear that the first victim would be Poland. And even if more money had been spent, if the defense strategy had been different, and if the French had entered the Saar with real vigor – perhaps the Poles would have fought longer. But the Russians would still have attacked them from behind. In 1939, Poland chose the option that seemed the best – an alliance with the West. The problem was that neither option was good at the time.
What fundamental mistakes did the Poles make? You highlight, for example, the cult of secrecy, which made coordinated action impossible.
– The Polish plan was quite sensible: to entrench themselves in positions that were easier to defend and not to defend areas where there was no chance. The problem was that no matter how quickly the Poles withdrew, the retreat was always too slow. Because they were dealing with German motorized units.
British war correspondent Clare Hollingworth wrote that the Poles do not realize that they will never be able to create a unified front line.
– In 1939, the units at the front did not know where their neighbours were and what their objectives were. Even the highest-ranking commanders were only informed about the tasks they themselves were supposed to perform. The Supreme Command often had little contact with reality at the front, sometimes drawing its information from German reports. In addition, this command left Warsaw at some point. This undoubtedly contributed to an even faster defeat. The Germans had an extremely extensive communication system, for example. And the Poles were blind and deaf… This is the cult of secrecy in the Polish army. It goes back to the time of Piłsudski.
And what can Poles be most proud of?
– Wherever they established defensive lines – near Mokra, Mława, Węgierska Górka – they fought brilliantly. Even Hitler praised the Polish soldier. In a speech in Gdańsk, he praised the Polish rank and file.
Was this war different from previous ones?
– Many things about the September campaign foreshadow what happened later. Like the deliberate targeting of civilians on a large scale – to such an extent that the dividing line between the front and the rest begins to blur. There are massive bombings of cities. Of course, there was the Spanish Guernica. But the scale of the bombings in Poland – in Wieluń, Warsaw, Frampol and many other places – was completely different from before. It was Polish cities that paved the way for what happened in Coventry and Dresden. We also have ethnic cleansing, in the autumn there were massacres in numerous cities and villages, the victims of which were prisoners and ordinary residents, Poles and Jews. The main motive was simple racism. And finally there is the blitzkrieg, although it is not fully developed. Some units use it, others do not. But because the Germans are moving very quickly, it all looks like a blitzkrieg.
What surprised you the most?
– The scale of the cruelty. It was a shock to me. It is often emphasized that during the Second World War we are dealing with rampant barbarity. The French campaign seems almost chivalrous and total war only begins in 1941, with the attack on the USSR. But it is clear that this theory is wrong. In 1939, the Germans murdered Poles for racial reasons, the Soviets for class reasons. The massacres of civilians are ideologically motivated. Szymon Datner calculated that during the September Campaign there were 15 massacres of civilians per day. While during the entire French campaign there were two. The difference is so striking.
You write about situations where there was direct interaction between German soldiers and the Red Army.
– Both sides tried to avoid each other. Stalin wanted to maintain the illusion of neutrality in this conflict. That is why Soviet commanders were ordered to maintain a distance of 25 kilometers from German troops. But it is clearly visible that where there was contact – cooperation during the capture of Lviv or during the famous victory parade in Brest – mutual relations were very difficult. For many years, soldiers on both sides felt that they were bitter enemies of each other. And this has not changed. Sometimes there were skirmishes between them.
In communist times, September 17 was presented as a humanitarian intervention; today’s Russian version is that the USSR never invaded Poland. In 2016, a blogger was prosecuted in Russia for publishing a text about Soviet-German cooperation in September 1939. Charge: “spreading false information.”
Did you study in Poland because you were a student of Norman Davies?
– I was his student, a researcher, and later I wrote a book with him about Wrocław. Norman shaped me as a historian.
At first, I was mainly interested in German history. But I have the impression that this history, especially that of the Third Reich, is stagnant. And there is not much more you can do. And Polish history is fascinating and gives much more scope for reinterpretation and writing something truly new. That is why I started writing about it. And I still intend to.
