The Russian military command predicted that Ukraine might launch an operation in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation and for several months developed plans to prevent this, writes The Guardian with reference to documents that the Ukrainian military withdrew from abandoned Russian positions in this region.
Fountain:The Guardian
DetailsThe publication writes that in late August its journalists met with Ukrainian special forces, who seized Russian documents. Among those seized in buildings in the Kursk region were Russian documents of the Interior Ministry, the FSB and the army. The journalists had the opportunity to view them and take photographs.
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The publication notes that it was unable to independently verify the authenticity of the documents, but at the same time stresses that “they bear signs of genuine communications from the Russian military.”
These Russian documents contain months-long warnings about a possible offensive by Ukrainian troops and also indicate concerns about the morale of the Russian military.
Some of the documents are printed orders sent to various units, while others are handwritten diaries recording events and problems at specific positions. The oldest records date back to late 2023, while the most recent documents date from just six weeks before Ukraine launched its offensive against Kursk province on August 6.
The documents mostly come from units of the 488th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, in particular from the second company of its 17th battalion.
“Ukraine’s offensive on Kurshchyna took kyiv’s Western partners and many in the Ukrainian elite by surprise, as very few people were involved in planning the operation. But Russian military documents contain months-long warnings of a possible invasion of the area and an attempt to capture Sukha, a town of 5,000 that has been under Ukrainian control for more than a month,” writes The Guardian.
In particular, the January 4 message discussed the “possibility of a breakthrough on the state border” by the Ukrainian armed forces. At the same time, Russian troops were ordered to intensify training in order to prepare to repel any attack.
On February 19, commanders of Russian units were warned about Ukraine’s plans for “a rapid advance from the Sumy region deep into Russian territory to a depth of up to 80 kilometers in order to create a four-day “corridor” until the arrival of Russian troops and the main armored units of the Ukrainian army.”
In mid-March, Russian border units were ordered to strengthen defensive lines and “organize additional exercises” in preparation for a cross-border attack by Ukraine.
“In mid-June, there was a more specific warning about Ukrainian plans “in the direction of Yunakivka-Sukha, with the aim of taking control of Sukha”, which indeed happened in August. It was also predicted that Ukraine would try to destroy the bridge over the Seim River to cut off Russian supply lines in the region, which later happened. In the June document, it was complained that Russian units stationed at the front were “only 60-70% strong on average and mostly consist of poorly trained reservists,” writes The Guardian.
The publication recalls: when the Ukrainian troops’ offensive began on August 6, many Russian soldiers left their positions, and within a week Ukraine took full control of Sukha. Moreover, during the chaotic retreat of the Russians, Ukrainian troops captured hundreds of soldiers, many of whom were conscripts.
The Guardian writes that the obtained documents provide insight into Russian tactics over the past year. One of the orders stated that there was no need to create trenches and positions with tank models and mannequins of soldiers to confuse Ukrainian reconnaissance drones. It was also stated that several servicemen should be sent to these positions to light fires at night, walk around with torches and move the mannequins from time to time. In addition, the Russians were to create radio communications over these positions in order to be able to intercept them.
The publication stresses that it is not clear whether such positions were ever created. Ukrainian reconnaissance drone operators operating in the area told the Guardian that they saw no evidence of such positions.
In March, Russian documents reported that cases of Ukrainian sabotage groups disguising themselves in order to work behind Russian troops wearing Russian uniforms had become more frequent. To prevent this, Russian commanders were asked to introduce into the army the use of certain identification signs “variant #6”, which were to be fixed with transparent adhesive tape.
In addition, these documents indicate serious problems with the morale of the Russians at the front. In particular, they mention suicides of Russian soldiers.
In addition, it emerged that commanders of Russian units were instructed to ensure that soldiers watched Russian state media on a daily basis to support their “psychological state.”
