Fear is growing in Russia. “It’s Putin’s fault” [ANALIZA]

Of course, we have to keep things in proportion. This crisis does not mean that a coup or revolution could happen at any moment. But many Russians believe that Putin is simply not in control. His mythical status as a “boss” who never makes mistakes has become untenable. Putin will survive. However, he will emerge from this situation even weaker. There is no doubt that this is a crisis for Putin and for Putinism.

From the very beginning, the authorities tried to downplay everything. The commander of the Russian troops announced on the second day that the Ukrainians had been detained.

– Putin tried not to call things by their names. He is kind of superstitious – he doesn’t talk about things that really scare him. Or he uses words like “situation” or “current circumstances”. Of course, he clearly realizes that this is a very serious threat.

When he chaired the first Security Council meeting after the Ukrainian invasion, he was in a bad mood and had to constantly consult his notes. He ordered his subordinates: “Just deal with it.” Without providing any leadership or offering a strategy on how to do it. This was classic Putin behavior in such a situation – hiding from the crisis. He withdrew from public view and placed the burden on others.

At the same time, you stress that Russians know very well that their state is corrupt and inept. The question is: won’t they soon simply forget Putin’s mistake?

– There is something very symbolic about the fact that Russian territory has been occupied for the first time since World War II. In the late 1960s, Soviet-Chinese border disputes led to skirmishes. But these were border battles, not an invasion of a foreign country into USSR territory. Ukraine’s previous incursions, mainly into the Belgorod region, were little more than a PR exercise: quickly cross the border to capture a few villages, take selfies, and then hastily retreat. This time it really is something big.

Russians realize that their state is incompetent and corrupt. However, this does not mean that they agree with everything. Putin was so popular because he seemed different from other Russian politicians. Yes, he was corrupt. But corrupt and competent, that is how he was thought of. When I talked to Russians, they told me: “We know very well that he and his cronies are building palaces with our money. But at least…” And then they pointed to some success.

And what about today? Let’s say you are an ordinary Russian. And you see that part of your country is occupied. You are afraid that there will be another mobilization. The decision to send conscripts to the Kursk region, contrary to previous promises – and some of them did not even receive minimal training – angers your parents. We also have a wave of surrender of Russian soldiers. The border fortifications that were supposedly built over the last two years turned out to be completely inadequate, if they existed at all. Contracts were awarded to Putin’s friends, and the money was often simply embezzled.

What’s more, you don’t feel any richer than you did a few years ago. Quite the contrary. Putin is finding it increasingly difficult to justify why his government is good.

The longer the war lasts, the better for Putin. He needs the war to stay in power.

Even before the Ukrainian operation, nearly 60 percent of Russians wanted the war to end. This is by far the highest level since the beginning of the invasion. After Kursk, this percentage is even higher.

– Most Russians would like the war to end, they also want negotiations. But negotiations do not necessarily mean concessions. First, people need to be willing to talk, or at least accept the concept of talking. And then they also need to be willing to accept the concept of concessions. The Russians are not at that stage yet. If this operation were to significantly shorten the war, the Ukrainians would have to deal a major blow to Russia. Literally destroy its troops. So that the Russians – from Putin to the simple peasant in Belgorod – reach a point where they think: “OK. We have to accept concessions. Just to end this.”

“Putin still hasn’t grasped the lesson Stalin learned after the first shock of the Nazi invasion: let the military experts do what they have to do,” he wrote recently. What does that mean for this war?

– There are truly competent people in the Russian military and civilian leadership. And it helps Ukraine a lot that Putin is not only a bad war leader, but also continues to support Gerasimov, who is a disastrous chief of the General Staff. When Shoigu was replaced by Belousov as defense minister, I feared that we would also see a new chief of the General Staff – for example, Teplinsky, the current head of the airborne forces, who would probably be much more competent in his new role. But fortunately, we can still be happy that Putin and Gerasimov are Ukraine’s secret weapon in the Kremlin. As is known, the Russians had advance information that the Ukrainians were concentrating their forces in the Kursk region and that some cross-border operation was expected. But the decision was made that it was not worth worrying about. Most likely, this decision was made by Gerasimov. Why – and this is another unforgivable mistake by Putin – did he not suffer any consequences? In my opinion, because his role is largely to be Putin’s “bulletproof vest”, absorbing all the criticism. When something goes wrong, Gerasimov takes all the blame. Moreover, if Putin were to fire Gerasimov, he would have to replace him with someone else. And what if that other person also fails? Then the blame could fall on Putin. Putin prefers the defeat of the Russian troops to his own defeat…

How long can Ukrainians remain on Russian territory? Many analysts emphasize that their situation will become very difficult when the Russians begin to counterattack, using aviation, guided bombs and the like.

– The Ukrainians were able to advance quickly in the initial stages of this operation because there was little Russian resistance. They are still advancing, but at a much slower pace. I don’t know how far they can go. It depends on how much military effort they are willing to put into it. Are they ready to withdraw more forces from Donbass? Zelensky talks about building a buffer zone along the border and suggests that this operation is aimed at obtaining a bargaining chip for negotiations with Putin. And if the Ukrainians plan to hold these territories, it means that they will have to go deeper. And then they will become a much easier target for the Russians. This means that they risk losing more soldiers from the best units, with the best Western equipment, than they can afford. But who knows? The Ukrainians have surprised us many times before, perhaps this time they have an ace up their sleeve…

CIA Director William Burns called Putin an “apostle of revenge.” After his rebellion, Prigozhin was still alive, but he was a “dead man in limbo.” And everyone just waited for him to die. What kind of revenge could Putin be planning for Ukraine?

– Killing Prigozhin was easy – he was operating inside Russia and was alone. It’s harder here. Besides, Putin has been incredibly ruthless in his operations since the beginning of the war. Plus, there aren’t many additional gratuitous powers – drones, missiles, etc. – at his disposal. In a way, he has limited his options for escalation. Precisely because he has been so gratuitously brutal so far. I’m sure he would like to take revenge on Ukraine, but realistically, the only strong options left to him – such as the use of tactical nuclear weapons – would be completely counterproductive.

Has Ukraine’s occupation of Russian lands changed this war?

– There are two dimensions here – political and military. On the political dimension, it is an undoubted success. The operation in the Kursk region really encouraged Ukrainians. It also challenged the prevailing narrative in the West: Russia is slowly but surely winning and there is nothing Ukrainians can do to reverse that. The Americans have sent more ammunition, the US and Europe are allowing the weapons they have supplied to Ukrainians to be used more freely. Anything that encourages the West to help Ukraine is very good.

Let’s be honest: the West does not treat this war as an existential conflict. Publicly, politicians stress that it is of fundamental importance and that Ukraine’s victory is a way to ensure security for everyone. But no one acts as if they believe it. For them, Ukraine’s defeat no longer means that Russian tanks will actually remain on the border of, say, Romania. They believe that in the worst case scenario, the Russians will occupy part of Ukraine and impose certain political restrictions.

And as for the military dimension: Nothing has been decided yet. Today, the Ukrainians are the absolute winners, but until this is over it is impossible to judge.

Do you think this has changed the way people in the Kremlin think? Just yesterday they were convinced that victory was near, and today they realized they were overconfident?

– We don’t know that yet either. If they defeat the Ukrainian forces and the battlefield is full of American Bradleys and Strykers, they will probably declare that everything is fine: “It was just a momentary setback with no consequences.” Putin has a tendency to find excuses, and people around him always try to give him such excuses. But I think that even the best-case scenario for the Russians will not be so favorable. And many people in Russia will interpret this as a sign that victory is not taken for granted. And this will be a factor that will deepen the rift between Putin and his elite. But it also has bad side effects.

Why?

– Because it gives Putin an incentive not to negotiate. Because when there is a semblance of peace, negative feelings towards him and his regime will start to grow in Russia. The longer the war lasts, the better for him. Therefore, he will push his country in this direction. Due to his own incompetence and unwillingness to recognize the needs of his own society in this situation. War is necessary for Putin to remain in power. I am sorry to announce the sad news, but it is the truth.

Marcos Galeotti (born 1965) is one of the world’s leading experts on Russia. He has worked at the British Foreign Office and lectured in London, New York, Moscow, Prague and Florence. He currently runs the Mayak Intelligence consultancy. He has published over 30 books, including: “We Need to Talk About Putin” (2019), “Putin’s Wars” (2022), “Everything is War. How the Powers Armed You” (2023)