by Helena Martins – A letter signed by more than 50 experts on digital platforms and their impact on the economy was launched this Tuesday, the 17th, demanding respect for Brazil’s digital sovereignty. The document titled Public Letter Against Big Tech’s Attack on Digital Sovereignty starts from a criticism of X’s position in the country and calls on “all those who defend democratic values to support Brazil in its efforts to achieve sovereignty. We demand that big tech companies stop their attempts to sabotage Brazil’s initiatives aimed at building independent capabilities in artificial intelligence, public digital infrastructure, data governance and cloud services.”
The text was written by Thomas Piketty, Mariana Mazzucato, Nick Srniceck, José Van Dijck, Evgeny Morozov, Anita Gurumurthy, Shoshana Zuboff, Cecília Rikap and others. The group also demands that the UN and governments support efforts around digital sovereignty.
The letter comes at a time that appears to be consolidating a shift in approach to digital platforms. This month, a series of legal actions in the European Union and the United States have highlighted what should have been obvious for a long time: the need to confront and limit the power of big tech.
The EU Court of Justice confirmed a €2.4 billion fine imposed on Google in 2017 by the European Commission, which found the company abused its dominant position by favoring its price comparison service, Google Shopping, to the detriment of competitors. On the same day, the Court also ordered Apple to pay €13 billion in tax debts to Ireland, after finding that the company had obtained an improper tax advantage, in a case opened in 2016. In the United States, the Department of Justice of the Treasury accused Google of illegally monopolizing the digital advertising sector.
As a result of processes such as the globalization of capital, financialization and the development of digital technologies within the framework of productive restructuring, these companies have grown using neoliberal ideas, justifying their establishment not by the absence of the state, but by a programmed change to facilitate private intervention in the economy. sector, an attitude that is considered fundamental in fostering innovation and competition. Nothing could be more illusory. Following the capitalist dynamics themselves, always prone to the concentration and centralization of capital, what we have seen in the last two decades is the rise of several North American companies that have expanded into different sectors, where they have acquired not only customers, but also data. fundamental to understand and even anticipate the functioning of the market. This has led to a scenario concentrated at a transnational level, thus weakening local economies and social organizations themselves.
This is because, on the one hand, the so-called platformization leads to a huge concentration of wealth, often achieved through the participation of platforms in speculative games on financial markets and through the appropriation of the wealth generated in the countries where they operate, such as Brazil, practically without paying taxes or creating jobs.
The results are presented annually in a list of the most valuable companies. In terms of market value, Microsoft is in first place, followed by Apple, Nvidia, Alphabet and Amazon, according to data from the Companies Market Cap website as of June 20242. On the other hand, these companies operate in a sector that is very sensitive to the autonomy of the population, with an emphasis on communication. In these operations, there is no neutrality. Manipulation practices, often disguised through recommendation mechanisms or content moderation, are quite common.
Even if subtly, the definition of its function even impacts the aesthetics (and, therefore, politics) of what circulates on the network. In addition, these platforms give visibility to those who pay for the so-called upgrades – which helps to highlight absurdities such as Brazil Paralelo or Pablo Marçal. Economy and culture, in these platforms, are clearly integrated to support power projects that are not democratic, let alone popular. The case of Elon Musk is a clear example of this and should not be considered an exception.
Despite the negative impacts of this situation, to this day the idea that the State should do nothing about this sector is still hegemonic. The neoliberal project that supports the rise of platforms has also led to a decline in the view of regulation, which was previously seen as a series of definitions of the functioning of society and each particular sector.
Following the idea of removing the state from its role in determining and proposing policies, an approach is promoted that revolves around the idea of self-regulation and governance, guided by the alleged horizontality between the different agents and mutually agreed definitions, which ultimately reduces the enormous power gaps and the different interests that mobilize each “stakeholder”. In practice, the absence of clear regulations in each location has allowed the expansion and restructuring of the sector, following in the footsteps of the North American position that guided and continues to dominate this re-regulation.
This series of changes has allowed the expansion and restructuring of not only a sector, but also of capitalism itself, as seen in the prominent role of technology in today’s competition between countries, with the United States and China at the forefront of the dispute. It is clear that this process is fraught with contradictions, most of which are exacerbated by the struggle of civil society in its attempt to expand the space of resistance to the power of private agents. Part of this framework is the assertion of new rights, such as the right to protection of personal data, and the attempt to regulate platforms – initiatives that have been consistently opposed by big tech, as seen in Brazil, both in the formulation of the General Data Protection Law (LGPD) and, more recently, in the debate on Bill (PL) 2,630/2020, which seeks to establish the Brazilian Law on Freedom, Responsibility and Transparency on the Internet, and on PL 2,338/2023, which regulates the use of Artificial Intelligence. However, these moves have proven insufficient.
Given the growing economic power of these platforms, a series of new legislative initiatives are underway, which now focus on so-called economic regulation. Until the first half of 2024, this movement is expressed, among others: the United States (American Innovation and Choice Online Act, Ending Platform Monopolies Act and Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021); Germany (Act on the Amendment of the Law Against Restrictions of Competition to a focused, proactive and digital Competition Law 4.0 and other provisions); Japan (Act on Enhancing Transparency and Fairness of Digital Platforms); Australia (Treasury Law Amendment Bill (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code) 2021); the United Kingdom (Digital Markets Unit); and the European Union (Digital Markets Act, Media Freedom Act and Artificial Intelligence Act).
Additionally, South Korea has approved amendments to the Telecommunications Business Act that would prohibit app stores of big tech companies from forcing developers to use their payment systems. In Canada, the government has amended some competition laws to include measures related to the digital environment. Other countries are discussing similar regulations, including India, Turkey and Brazil.
This list highlights the growing demand for significant action by States at the national level. In general, the initiatives mentioned propose measures such as market reservations for local companies (a dynamic that largely guides the European Union’s approach) and protection mechanisms for sectors affected by the presence of platforms, especially the press (which resulted in Facebook’s aggressive movement against the rules established in Canada and Australia). They are thus a movement that could contribute to limiting the power of the large North American platforms. On the other hand, it is clear that the proposed regulations are not intended to change the scenario. Without this, they would leave the diversity clearly visible, but would result in an increase in inequality, exploitation, oppression and surveillance of the same states and societies.
Instead, we need to question the processes of concentration of social production (and not just markets) around platforms and their logic of operation – that is, to argue for social regulation in the broad sense. The problem can be addressed in two other ways, besides proposing rules. First, from the mobilization of the State as a policy inducer. Platforms are making progress in the acquisition of submarine cables, the commercialization of data storage and cloud computing services, and other dynamics that deepen dependence on these cables.
To overcome this, we need to build our own infrastructure and applications, paying attention to economic dynamics and rights, data protection and dialogue with local needs. In Brazil, there are discordant steps in this direction. On the one hand, the important sovereign “cloud” project is being resumed, under the leadership of Serpro. The AI for the Good of All plan for artificial intelligence has also been launched. On the other hand, the entire internet access policy is guided by the interests of private companies (including Starlink) and there is no sign of a resumption of free software policies – on the contrary, the adoption of corporate digital platforms is advancing in the public sector, education etc.
This leads to the second movement, which I think is fundamental to qualify what is called digital sovereignty: the affirmation of an alternative political project, which also includes the technological project. The question, therefore, is not of doing more of the same, but of defining, with autonomy, what we want from these new technologies, in order to mobilize, the whole of society and the best of our abilities. As stated in the letter released today, “the case of Brazil has become the vanguard of the growing global conflict between digital companies and those seeking to build a democratic and citizen-centered digital landscape focused on social and economic development.” Brazil can contribute to the coordination of countries of the South to confront the power of the platforms and collectively seek alternative solutions. There is still time to pull the “emergency brake”, but decisions and actions are needed.
Helena Martins
Professor at the Federal University of Ceará, postdoctoral student in Economics at the Federal University of Sergipe (with funding from Fapesp) and member of DiraCom – Right to Communication and Democracy.
